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 ABSTRACT 
Geographies that matter – the rhetorical deployment of physicality? 
 
Matthew B. Kearnes 
Department of Geography 
The Open University 
 
 
 
Jackson (2000) proposes a ‘re-materialisation’ of social and cultural geography. He argues 
for the grounding of geographical analysis in the concrete world of actual physical 
objects. Examining the work of Jackson (2000) and Miller (1987, 1998) this paper 
interrogates this return to the physical. In particular this paper argues that current 
articulations of physicality rely on a universal metaphysics of matter – positing matter as 
a universally undifferentiated conditionality. This reliance is problematic in that it 
signifies an essentialist dichotomy between the objective (the material) and the subjective 
(the textual). Also this dichotomy necessitates a linear dialectics of matter subjugating the 
material to the determinative action of form. In subjecting Jackson’s notion of 
rematerialisation to a critical philosophical reading the aim is to disturb the unquestioned 
metaphysical implications of this return. Indeed it is to suggest that a rematerialisation of 
social and cultural geography must account for the wayward expressiveness of matter – 
its representative and active capacities outside its relation with the subject. 
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ARTICLE 
Geographies that matter – the rhetorical deployment of physicality? 
 
Matthew B. Kearnes 
Department of Geography 
The Open University 
 
O God, I could be bounded in a nutshell and count myself a King of infinite 
space. Hamlet, II:2 
 
Introduction 
The theme of this special edition of Social and Cultural Geography – ‘Culture Matters’ –
resonates with a number of themes current within geographical thought. The double 
meaning of ‘matter’ – simultaneously designating a concept of worth (the verb ‘to 
matter’) and a physical ‘materiality’ (the noun ‘matter’) – is symbolic of the broad scope 
of its terms. In the first instance matter is used in asserting the significance of certain 
academic accounts. For a particular account to be significant – to be of strategic, political 
or professional importance – it must ‘matter’. Put in this way the rhetorical force of 
matter is clear. Imbued with notions of the undiluted physicality of ‘the real’, for a 
representation ‘to matter’ it must be mimetically linked with an external materiality – the 
real world. ‘To matter’ is thus simultaneously to designate the importance of a particular 
representation and to engage in the active creation of a mimetic materiality. ‘To matter’ is 
therefor also ‘to do matter’, to produce certain forms of physicality deemed discursively 
significant. In this way matter occupies a rhetorical position within contemporary 
geographical criticism. The material connotations of matter – its sensuous proximity to 
the real – are used to signify the veracity or significance of certain representations. The 
theme ‘Culture Matters’ echoes this rhetoric by provocatively recalling the early criticisms 
of cultural geography as lacking material bases and therefor interpretative significance 
(Badcock, 1996; Mitchell, 1995; 1996)1.  These criticisms suggested that cultural analyses 
lack grounding in material reality (a limited characterisation at best) and therefor they also 
lack significance. The effect of these criticisms is to suggest that cultural geography does 
not produce an appropriately mimetic materiality – that it is abstract or novel – and thus 
that it ‘does not matter’. For example Mitchell (1995) directly contrasts the analysis of 
cultural against matter – as an analysis of ephemerality. He states that: 
 
[F]or all the important theoretical and empirical advances this reconceptualization 
(of culture) has induced, cultural geography still reifies ‘culture’ and assigns it an 
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 ontological and explanatory status. … I argue instead for a focus on the material 
development of the idea (or ideology) of culture. (p. 102, emphasis added) 
 
For Mitchell (1995) culture cannot be reified as an explanatory device simply because it 
has no material physicality. Culture, for Mitchell, does not matter. It is the possibility of 
analysis unconnected – and seemingly unconcerned – with material and empirical reality 
that troubles both Mitchell and Badcock. The terminology of matter – of the potent 
significance of the material – is deployed symbolically against this very possibility. Culture 
is denied any ontological basis outside its physical materialisation. Heroically returning 
analysis to the mimetic safety of matter the significance of geographical scholarship is 
presented as proportional to its connection with empirical and material reality. The 
rhetorical articulation of ‘geographies that matter’ has involved an articulation of the 
physicality of its field of enquiry. For example there have been a number of calls for a 
geographical return to a grounding in physical materiality. Jackson (2000) proposes a ‘re-
materialisation’ of social and cultural geography – a return to more traditional 
geographical concerns based in the ‘actual’ life-world of people. Similarly Philo (2000) 
proposes a ‘re-introduction of the material in human geography’. There is a distinction 
here in the precise connotations of both Jackson’s and Philo’s (re)invocation of matter in 
human geography. For Jackson to re-introduce a kind of materialist analysis is to refocus 
attention on the relationship between people and things (Lees, 2002). Whereas Philo is 
driven by a Latourian desire to expressly re-valorise the irreducible materiality of the 
objects of geographic research. Indeed Philo (2000) makes this claim by suggesting that 
matter is somehow lost within contemporary social and cultural geography. He states: 
 
Yet , what I wish to signpost now are some concerns that I (and others) have 
about this dematerializing of human geography: the preoccupation with immaterial 
cultural processes, with the constitution of intersubjective meaning systems, with 
the play of identity politics through the less-than-tangible, often-fleeting spaces of 
texts, signs, symbols, psyches, desires, fears and imaginings. I am concerned that, 
in the rush to elevate such spaces in our geographical studies, we have ended up 
being less attentive to the more ‘thingy’, bump-into-able, stubbornly there-in-the-
world kinds of ‘matter’ (the material) with which earlier geographers tended to be 
more familiar. (p. 33) 
 
It is suggested that the analysis of culture – which has hitherto been confined to an 
hermeneutic consideration of cultural, textual, and discursive meaning – needs to be firmly 
grounded in the analysis of the physical manifestation of culture (Gregson, 1995; Miller, 
1987; 1998). Thus, for example, it is suggested that contemporary studies of cultural 
 3
 consumption must consider the materiality of consumed objects rather than rely solely 
upon abstract semiotic or textual methodologies. In this way the double meaning of 
matter is simultaneously deployed – that for geographies to ‘matter’ they must return to 
‘the material’. In this way this paper analyses the double meaning of this return to matter 
– the proposition that representative significance is necessarily tied to material physicality. 
Indeed the subject of this discussion is not only this articulation of a kind of physicalist 
analysis into geography but also the way in which it is expressly constructed as a return to 
a more basic form of analysis.  
 
‘The physical’ connotes a diverse range of contemporary thought. Feminist scholars have 
called for an analysis of the ways in which subjectivity and cognition are formed through 
a bodily inhabitation of the physical world (Grosz, 1994; Gatens, 1996; Kirby, 1997; 
Longhurst, 1997). Indeed, Butler (1993; 1994; 1997) initiated the use of term 
‘materialisation’ to express the ways in which the corporeal subject is materialised 
through regimes of power and discourse. The notion of a corporeal inhabitation of the 
physical world – or ‘dwelling’ – the inter-subjective experience of the material world has 
also been explored by authors challenging the inherent anthropocentrism of ‘human’ 
geography. In exploring the ways in which human dwelling(s) of and in the material 
world are necessarily co-dependent upon non-human actors (Ingold, 1995) notions of 
the non-human and material subjectivity, sociality and relationality have been explored 
(Murdoch, 1997; Whatmore, 1997; 2000). Also drawing upon the work of Latour’s (1993) 
notion of a ‘parliament of things’, Law’s (1994; see also Law and Mol [1995]) conception 
of a ‘relational materialism’ and Serres’ (1995) quizzical ‘quasi-object’, contemporary 
authors in geography have sought to re-read the traditional philosophical subject-object 
relation precisely as a relational intersubjectivity (Bingham, 1996; Hinchliffe, 1996). Indeed, 
the focus upon the various ways in which human subjectivity is constituted in and 
through a relational embodiment of the material, natural and inter-subjective world 
necessitates a valorisation of the physical.  
 
In these ways both the material and the physical are invoked tangentially. That is matter 
is implicated in an analysis of the embodiment of the subject in a physical body, in a 
notion of discursive materialisation and in the re-thinking of the subject-object relation as 
a complex network. This paper does not attempt to deal with the breadth of this field. 
Rather it is the deployment of the notion of physicality – the ‘thingness’ of things, the 
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 tactility of matter – that this paper explicitly explores. In fact the notion of physicality – 
the valorisation of the cultural ‘object’ over meaning, discourse and language – advanced 
in the work of Miller (1987; 1998), Jackson (2000), Philo (2000) and Lees (2002) is 
specifically addressed in this discussion2. Whereas other movements insinuate a notion of 
‘the physical’ or ‘the (materially) relational’ these authors extend their analytical scope to 
matter itself. The significance of this fact is that by constructing a rematerialisation these 
authors awaken a metaphysical Pandora’s box. To discuss matter is to discuss one of the 
most philosophically enduring concepts in Western metaphysics. The idea that social and 
cultural geography may simply ‘return’ to a lost materialism must be enlivened with a 
thorough consideration of which (or perhaps whose) matter we are returning to3.   
 
The aim here is to complicate notions of physicality by suggesting that contemporary calls 
for a return to the material problematically adopt a universal metaphysics of matter. 
Western philosophical history is dominated by a conception of a universal, Aristotelian 
metaphysics of matter – that matter is a universal attribute of all things that exist 
physically. Matter is that which forms the universal ontological basis of all existing things. 
Such universalist tendencies in the wider philosophical consideration of matter present 
many dilemmas for a geographical project that aims to be theoretically non-essentialist 
(through the critique of hegemonic dualisms) and methodologically particularist (through 
ethnographic analyses of specific materialities). As such this paper suggests that calls for a 
‘return to the material’ in social and cultural geography must be more philosophically 
explicit. Without candid consideration of the metaphysical connotations of a ‘return to 
the material’ such a project remains ill conceived and self-contradictory. By considering 
the metaphysical implications of these moves I will conclude by suggesting a notion of 
the ‘expressive physicality of matter’ – that matter is not simply a base to which 
geographical analysis may return. Rather to construct a material analysis is to ‘collaborate’ 
with the physical, to enliven its own capacities and variances.  
 
A ‘return to the material’ 
Jackson (2000) paraphrasing Gregson (1995) calls for a renewed grounding of social and 
cultural geography in the materiality of culture.  
… Nicky Gregson warned that social geography’s recent obsession with meaning, 
identity, representation and ideology was in danger of replacing studies that were 
more firmly grounded in material culture or concerned with socially significant 
differences of gender, class, race, sexuality or (dis)ability. While the potential 
evacuation of ‘the social’ in social and cultural geography remains a serious 
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 concern, it is the other less remarked part of Gregson’s commentary that most 
concerns me here, heralding the revival of a material culture perspective in social and 
cultural geography. (p. 9, emphasis added) 
 
He suggests that contemporary geographical research practices have largely ignored the 
physical manifestations of the objects of their analysis. Jackson, in concert with Gregson, 
suggests that cultural geography’s utilisation of contemporary theories of representation 
has served to obscure the material manifestation of culture. There is a concern that the 
current integration of post-structuralist and post-modernist theories into mainstream 
geographical practice has resulted in a limiting textual bias. It is suggested that 
contemporary theories of discourse have negated the need for a consideration of the 
material altogether – that the analysis of culture through linguistic and semiotic strategies 
has largely resulted in the disappearance of the ‘real’ object from contemporary analysis 
(Vattimo, 1988; Kirby, 1999). For example: 
And yet, although the difference between words and experience is a difference 
that seems to require no special justification in everyday life, this simple wisdom 
undergoes a significant make-over when it enters the academy. Postmodern meta-
critique for example, informs us that language is the irreducible object of all 
analysis. Language determines the particular purchase and shape of different 
disciplinary formations; it illuminates the psychological architecture of the 
interpreting subject; and its internal structuration explains the inevitable 
contamination between subject and object. Language becomes a mode of 
production whose effects are so pervasive and persuasive that even materiality 
evaporates into an idée fixe. (Kirby, 1999, 19) 
 
Kirby’s acerbic critique of current scholarship suggests that an unhealthy fixation upon 
language has resulted in the destruction of the most basic, everyday distinction between 
words and experience. The denigration of this distinction, by epistemological strategies 
that posit language as a totalising system of signification, has meant that even matter – the 
most fundamental basis of ‘real’ experience – has disappeared from current thought. For 
Jackson (2000), Philo (2000) and Lees (2002) the dominance of textual methodologies 
have obscured fuller analysis of the materiality of contemporary culture. Both Jackson 
(2000) and Philo (2000) evoke the physicality of cultural forms and artifacts as an 
alternative analyical grounding. Jackson’s call for a re-materialisation of social and cultural 
geography and Philo’s appeal for a re-introduction of the material is an attempt to 
construct an analysis of culture that takes this physicality seriously – to re-direct 
geographical analysis away from textual, semiotic and discursive methodologies towards 
the material manifestations of culture in the actual object. Both assert that there is a need to 
return to ways in which culture is manifested materially. Both suggest that the analysis of 
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 practices of consumption, for example, should no longer be confined to semiotic or de-
constructive reading of consumptive imagery and texts. Rather the analysis of 
consumption should, it is suggested, include a thorough ethnographic consideration of 
the physical objects consumed, and the ways they are materially incorporated into the 
embodied life-world of the consumer. This methodology is propelled by a broader desire 
to understand what people actually do when they consume.  
 
The language of ‘a return to matter’ – of re-materialisation – suggests that matter occupies 
a pre-existent and a priori position with respect to language and text. The methodological 
distinction made by Jackson (2000) and Philo (2000) between text and matter subtly 
points to the metaphysical effect of Jackson’s and Philo’s return to the material. Textual, 
semiotic and discursive strategies are cast solely as renderings of the object – 
teleologically secondary and categorically distinct from the object of representation. This 
conceptualisation represents the material, the natural and the bodily as in some way a 
priori to forms of language and representation. The material forms a pre-existing, and 
absolute conditionality upon the construction of knowledge through language. The 
representation of matter as a form of ‘original state’ – as the pure thing outside the 
operation of discourse and independent (in the Kantian sense) from the subjective action 
– is indicative of the proximity of these calls to an essentialist metaphysics.  
 
The enterprise of returning ‘strategically’, ideally, to an origin or to a ‘priority’ 
held to be simple, intact, normal, pure, standard, self-identical, in order then to 
think in terms of derivation, complication, deterioration, accident etc. all 
metaphysicians, from Plato to Rousseau, Descartes to Husserl, have proceeded in 
this way, conceiving good before evil, the positive before the negative, the pure 
before the impure, the simple before the complex, the essential before the 
accidental, the imitated before the imitation, etc. And this is not just one 
metaphysical gesture among others, it is the metaphysical exigency, that which has 
been the most constant, most profound. (Derrida, 1988, quoted in Kirby, 1999). 
 
 
Derrida suggests that the strategic return to forms of material originality – the ‘real’ 
object of analysis – constitutes a metaphysical move par excellence. The crucial term in 
Derrida’s designation is the term before, indicating the teleologic quality of the calls for a 
return to forms of pure originality. Similarly, calls for a re-materialisation of social and 
cultural geography represent matter as an analytical ground by virtue of its pre-existing 
physicality. Although Jackson (2000) states that: ‘[O]ur emphasis should be on when and 
where the materiality of material culture makes a difference rather than assuming its 
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 importance in an a priori manner’ (p. 13), matter is articulated in both a priori and Kantian 
terms as both absolutely physical and fundamentally pure. Similarly in constructing his 
material re-introduction Philo (2000) discusses the work of Lees and operationises a 
notion of matter as both basic and universal: ‘Lees ranges fully across a host of different 
material and immaterial realms. The brute there-ness of the buildings and its contents is 
described …’ (p. 35, emphasis added). It is only by the unquestioned assumption of a 
Kantian notion of matter’s metaphysical priority that Philo is able to insinuate the 
meaning of matter is a brutal there-ness. There is nothing inherent to matter that ensures 
either its brutality or its physical stability. Rather these notions are simple meanings that 
matter assumes under the influence of a universalist metaphysics. 
 
Essence and image 
This notion of re-materialisation, advocated by Jackson (2000), Philo (2000) and Lees 
(2002) establishes a dichotomy between words and experience – or between the real 
world of matter and the abstract realm of discourse. As stated above it is suggested that 
contemporary theoretical strategies have – for the sake of intellectual fashion – largely 
ignored the ‘real’ world in all its physical messiness and uncertainty. It is suggested that 
the sheer immensity of the material world has proved too difficult to intellectual 
scholarship, which has by-and-large retreated towards the more manageable and stable 
grounds of language. It is the distinction between the material and the linguistic that is 
held to be paramount. For example: 
Material culture differs from, for example, linguistics partly in the sheer diversity 
of its subject matter. In the case of language many of the most interesting things 
that an academic can address relate to the generality of linguistic phenomena. In 
material culture, by contrast, although this is also a possible strategy there is a 
great deal more potential in looking at the diversity of material form than would 
be the case with linguistics. (Miller, 1998, 6) 
 
In this way language and matter are presented as opposing realms, matter as defiantly 
diverse and multiple and language as limited, confined and as knowable4. Indeed, the 
material operates as a sign for the natural, the pre-discursive or the a priori. In this account 
matter stands for that which is prior to – and forms a basis for – human experience, 
perception and knowledge. The radical diversity of matter – the seeming omnipresence 
of matter – signifies the impossibility of confining the material realm within knowable 
boundaries. In this way the works of language are cast as perpetually secondary to the 
pre-eminent materiality and pre-discursivity of the ‘real’ world. In comparison to the 
infinite multiplicity of matter language is presented as simply a product of human 
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 experience, as a posteriori, and therefor as a finite image of the external world. Miller’s 
(1987; 1998) re-articulation of the significance of the material within cultural studies 
represents an attempt to heroically ‘get back to basics’ – to refuse the valorisation of 
mediated (ie linguistic) knowledge over ethnographic, experiential and material 
knowledge. 
 
The methodological distinction established between subjective textuality and objective 
physicality is informed by a palpable distrust of contemporary semiotic, textual and de-
constructive methodologies. These methodologies represent the possibility of 
representative analysis disconnected from the referent. This distrust of textual and 
discursive strategies – a fear of the power of the image (Jay, 1993) – mirrors both the 
Platonic distrust of the image and notions of religious idolatry. Plato (383 BC [1955]) 
constructs a dualism between the object and its appearance. The reality of the object is, 
for Plato, defined by the essence of the object, a fundamental and irreducible attribute of 
every physical object. In comparison the image of an object is divorced from the essence 
of the object. The object is defined objectively by its essence, whilst the image is simply a 
secondary resemblance of the object. An object has an essence or reality in and of itself, by 
virtue of the fact that it IS. The essence of the object is not the physical tactility of the 
object’s contours, which are based in appearance and sensation, but is the IDEA of the 
object. The essence is the irreducible reality that is endowed in the object, by which it is 
possible to claim that it exists independently of other objects. Alternatively an object’s 
physical appearance, or its representation in other medium (for example a work of art), 
has no essence it and of itself. The representation of the object does not exist 
independently but is rather a copy or imitation of the object’s essence. The 
representation is tied mimetically to, and is therefor dependent upon, the object’s 
essence. The object is thus the model and its appearance is the copy (Plato, 383 BC 
[1955]). 
 
Plato constructs a range of dualisms, around the central essence/appearance dichotomy, 
such as substance/form, model/copy and philosophy/poetry. Always valorising the first 
term in each dichotomy Plato constructs an ontological critique of the arts as solely 
imitative, divorced from the originality of philosophy (Plato, 383 BC [1955]; Deleuze, 
1967). For example he discusses the relationship of the painting with the original 
depicted object: 
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“You may perhaps object that the things he (the craftsman or painter) creates are 
not real; and yet there is a sense in which the painter creates a bed, isn’t there?” 
“Yes”, he agreed, “He produces and appearance of one.” 
… 
“If then, what he makes is not ‘what a bed really is’ his product is not ‘what is’ 
but something that resembles ‘what is’ without being it.” (Plato, 383 BC [1955], 424) 
 
Plato’s aim is to establish a universal image-free metaphysics. He is wary of the image and 
its capacity to produce resemblances divorced from the essence of the object. The danger 
posed by the image is the danger of idolatry – that as secondary and lesser to the object it 
has the power to replace the object with the mere play of resemblances. In this way the 
possibilities for the reproduction of images with no reference to the original object is 
most concerning. It is the potential proliferation of copies without referent, the order of 
simulacra, that Plato designates as most deleterious to the ideal society.  
 
Indeed, it is this anxiety regarding the possibility of representation not bound to an 
essential, or fundamentally pre-discursive reality that is at the heart of calls to ground 
research in the materiality of cultural objects. For example Gregson (1995), Miller (1987, 
1998) and Jackson (2000) react against the very possibility of representative simulacra – 
the proliferation of novel representations that bear no relation to an external material 
reality of the both the object or the subject’s embodied interaction with it. The call for a 
re-materialisation of social and cultural geography constitutes a Platonic drive to re-
establish and re-enforce the link between academic representation and essentially real 
objects. The fact that representation, discourse and language are cast as secondary to the 
material – only ever imitations of the object, the a posteriori action of (finite) human 
reason upon the (infinite) metaphysics of the material – necessitates a return toward this 
more fundamental basis.  
 
Given the political and theoretical aims of the contemporary re-articulations of the 
material in geography the suggestion that they parallel Plato’s essence-image dichotomy is 
contentious. The aims of this current move toward an articulation of the material, the 
natural and the bodily (Grosz, 1994; Kirby, 1997; Whatmore 1997; Wolch & Emel 1995, 
1998) are toward a non-essentialist and non-dualistic geographical practice – through a 
considered critique of the existing dualisms of body-mind, matter-language and nature-
culture. The suggestion that this re-valorisation of the ‘real’ over the ‘mediated’ mirrors 
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 Plato’s most basic essentialism – the separation between essence and image – points to 
the vulnerability of this current of thought to a mindless essentialism of the natural. 
Authors such as Grosz (1999) and Whatmore (1997) have highlighted the potential for 
calls for the ‘return’ to the material, the bodily or the natural are fraught with the 
potential of a resurgence of the essentialism of ‘the real’. Indeed, when it is suggested 
that the material, the bodily or the natural constitute a fundamental ground upon which 
to base geographical inquiry there is a danger that this basis is posited simply as an 
undifferentiated externality. As such there is a slippage between the re-valorisation of the 
material and an articulation of a universal metaphysics of the material, the natural or the 
bodily (Kirby, 1999). 
 
There are two implications of the parallel between Plato’s division between image and 
essence and the contemporary re-materialisation of social and cultural geography. As 
stated above it suggests the possibility of a re-emergence of an essentialism of the real. 
This possibility points to the potential for contemporary articulations of matter, the body 
and the natural to unquestionably reify notions of a natural, bodily or material origin. 
Secondly the distinction constructed between language and experience institutes a 
methodological division. The appearance of the thing is cast as both teleologically 
secondary and inferior metaphysically. The methodologies of sight, painting, writing and 
poetry are all considered secondary to the pure realm of the thing and the idea (ie 
philosophy). In a similar fashion calls for a ‘return to the material’ suggest that the 
current academic employment of theories of representation, discourse and imagery 
actually serve to obscure the ‘real’ object of analysis.  
 
In this way methodologies of language and discourse are cast Platonically as endowed 
only with a limited (and often only academically fashionable) resemblance to the object. 
Take for example Gregson’s (1995) conception of the need for a ‘material culture 
perspective’ in the analysis of practices of consumption. 
 
The geographical literature on consumption highlight clearly the ascendance of 
the cultural, as opposed to social, theory in social geography (and in human 
geography more generally), and cultural theory in the tradition of Gramsci, 
Williams, Hall, and Said. At times inspirational, these writings manifestly have 
much to commend them. However, they bring with them a particular 
interpretation of consumption grounded in meaning, identity, representation and 
ideology. Personally, although I find these arguments attractive, I feel they require 
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 a firmer grounding in structural social inequalities (the significant differences of 
gender, class, race, sexuality, (dis)ability, etc.) and in material culture. (p. 139) 
 
In this way Gregson constructs a framework whereby the interpretation of textual, 
discursive and representative meaning is considered epistemologically distinct from the 
‘real’ world of both matter and structural inequalities. Gregson mirror’s Plato’s dualism 
by suggesting that these textual methodologies require a firmer grounding, thereby 
divorcing language, text and imagery from the fundamental essence of the ‘real’ world. 
Indeed, it is the suggestion that ‘material culture’ may provide this firmer ground – as if 
‘the material’ is somehow more solid, more natural and more real – that points to the 
presence of a universal metaphysics of the material in Gregson’s account.  
 
Matter as origin 
In positing a universal metaphysics of matter – a notion of materiality as a pure origin or 
radical outside – matter is divorced from any expressive physicality. In fact a conception 
of matter as origin institutes a deductive teleology whereby matter is governed by a linear 
passage from its origin as pure material form to its destination as a social and cultural 
product. Take for example Miller’s (1987) conception of the process of consumption: 
 
[C]onsumption as work may be defined as that which translates the object from 
an alienable to an inalienable condition; that is from a symbol of estrangement 
and price value to an artifact invested with particular inseparable connotations. … 
Work in this sense does not necessarily mean physical labour transforming the 
object; it may signify the time of possession, a material context of presentation as 
ritual gift or memorabilia, or the incorporation of the single object into a stylistic 
array which is used to express the creator’s place in relation to peers engaged in 
similar activities. The object is transformed by its intimate association with a 
particular individual or social group, or with the relationship between these. 
(p.191) 
 
Miller (1987) presents a dialectical notion of the material – whereby matter is subject to a 
teleological process of ‘externalisation’ and ‘sublation’. Miller’s model of the production 
of matter speaks in terms of a relation of distances. The object – the pure material form 
– is initially distanced from the subject as a radical outside, a ‘symbol of estrangement’. It 
is only subsequent to this pure original state – whereby the object undergoes the social 
and cultural work of consumption that it is transformed into a consumed object. 
 
Again Miller states that:  
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 ‘… the modern process of consumption is a much neglected part of the great 
process of sublation by which society attempts to create itself through negation’ 
(p. 191) 
 
What is interesting here is not Miller’s conception of the process of consumption but 
rather his conception of the malleability of the object’s materiality. The fact that he 
constructs the subject-object relation with reference to Hegel’s dialectic between 
alienation and sublation means that the production of the product is cast simply as the 
incorporation of a universal (and universally malleable) by socio-cultural systems. The 
fact that consumption is a process whereby society attempts to create itself positions 
matter as devoid of any creative power or defiance. In fact the methodological distinction 
between the material and the culture (essence and image) contributes to a notion of 
objection as a teleological process of externalisation followed by sublation leaving matter 
inert and ineffective. 
 
 
The effect of this teleological process of externalisation and sublation is to posit matter 
as a priori. The notion of ‘externalisation’ is the equivalent of Derrida’s notion of purity 
quoted above, that material objects originate in a pure physical form upon which the 
latter action of the consumer is enacted. The notion of distance inherent in a conception 
of externalisation re-articulates matter as a priori precisely because it specifically instigates 
a notion of the object as absolutely (in the Kantian sense) external to subjective action. In 
this way the material, whilst representing a state of absolute and infinite externality, 
always has an origin. The material is cast as resolutely prior to and disconnected from 
subjective action. In fact it is only the physical contours of the object (as distinct from 
the essential object in Platonic terms) that forms a dialectical conduit between the subject 
and the object. Rather than a constant interplay between the subject and the object, this 
relationship is governed by the dialectics of sublation. In this way the materiality of the 
object becomes simply a synthetic point between the subject and the essential object – 
between an a priori object and an a posteriori subject. The articulation of the material in this 
way forms a critical stage in the re-articulation of a universal and essentialist metaphysics 
of the material.  
 
The stages of Miller’s teleological process of externalisation and sublation attempt to map 
the materialisation of the object, from its origin at the point of institutional or mechanical 
formation to its final societal and cultural incorporation. Not only does the implicit 
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 periodisation and linearity of this scheme assume matter as a fundamental a priori but 
matter remains inert and inexpressive throughout its formation. Matter simply exists as 
an undifferentiated yet dumb externality before its mechanical and institutional formation. 
The subsequent process of sublation simply points to the societal incorporation of the 
physical thing without necessarily challenging its mute materiality. In this way Miller’s 
schema replicates the form-content dichotomy that matter’s materialisation as an object 
is not due to any independent action of matter, but rather the determinative power of the 
object’s essential form (the idea). 
 
Similarly Lees (2002) in discussing the contribution of urban geography to a re-
materialised social and cultural geography positions matter in terms of its starkness: 
 
Unlike in, say, social and cultural geography, the turn to ‘representation’ in urban 
geography has centred on (the material) urban form. This focus on urban 
spatiality is not surprising given the city’s stark physicality and obvious layering of 
economic, cultural, political and social relations. (p.107, emphasis added) 
 
Similarly Philo’s  (2000) notion of the re-introduction of the material into contemporary 
geography is imbued with this conception of the metaphysical externality, base-ness and 
stability of matter as he equates matter with concrete, stating: ‘More concretely (or even 
more materially)’ (p. 37). Both Lees and Philo, together with Miller, position matter as 
some how both obvious – as simply there – and as radically external – as in a concrete 
basis upon which all other activity is placed. In this way a reductive logic of causality 
haunts current calls for a ‘material culture’ approach or a rematerialisation of 
contemporary social and cultural geography. An external materiality is acted upon by 
socio-cultural consumption and thus becomes an object. In this way the object is only 
granted objectivity insofar as it is culturally coded. Miller’s reliance on Hegel’s dialectical 
phenomenology confirms this logic of causality. Although Hegel’s phenomenology 
purports to investigate the a priori conditions of knowledge – such as an absolute 
materiality – the central figure of Hegel’s dialectic is the subject (Lawlor, 1998). In this 
way absolute spatial and material infinitude is centralised upon the subject because it is 
only through the subject (externalisation-sublation) that the object is produced. While a 
phenomenological approach appears to allow an account of matter outside its socio-
cultural codification, the dialectic established between subject and object counters this 
aim. Indeed, although Miller, Philo and Jackson purport to construct an analysis that 
dwells in the physical tactility of the object it becomes clear that the materiality of the 
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 object only matters inasmuch as it becomes symbolic of the process of subjective 
consumption. For example Jackson (2000): 
 
From such a perspective, the meaning of material objects is embedded in specific 
cultural contexts as people use things (from ‘traditional’ pottery to ‘modern’ 
shopping centres) to objectify social relationships, providing a commentary on 
their social experience. (p. 10) 
 
The physicality of the object is reduced to a sign of the relationship between the subject 
and the object, the material object is positioned simply as a ‘commentary’ upon 
subjective experience. Indeed, the materiality of the object – held to be paramount by 
Jackson – is finally divorced from the full materialisation of its physical manifestation. 
Matter only matters insofar as it objectifies ‘social relationships’. As such Jackson’s return 
to matter becomes simply a sign, a rhetorical strategy in the suggestion of a more ‘back-
to-basics’ ethnographic methodology. The fact that the phenomenological notion of the 
matter operationalises a Kantian notion of matter as a priori disables a consideration of 
the materiality of matter. In fact the incorporation of matter as a priori signifies the 
subjugation of the material to a deductive teleology whereby matter only matters when 
connected to the subject. In this way the materiality of the object matters only inasmuch 
as it ‘objectifies social relationships’ rather than as fundamentally independent and active.  
 
Conclusion – Toward an expressive physicality 
An unasked question that haunts contemporary notions of the re-materialisation of social 
and cultural geography is; ‘what matters about matter?’. Why is there a rhetorical link 
established between material physicality and academic significance? The current re-
articulations of matter, as expressed by Gregson (1995), Miller (1998), Jackson (2000), 
Philo (2000) and Lees (2002), posit a ‘simple there-ness’ of matter – matter as the pre-
discursive form of the object. Indeed these current notions of matter subjugate the 
material to the Platonic dualism between essence and image and also to the reductionism 
of a linear teleology of materiality. In this way matter only matters when it is centralised 
upon the subject – symbolic of the objectification of social relationships. The expressive 
waywardness of matter – the possibility of active forms of materiality outside the 
dialectics of the subject-object is expressly forbidden through this reductionism (Latour, 
1993, Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, Law, 1994).  
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 However to return to matter is to ‘speed-up’ geography, to subject its analysis to the 
particular infinity of physicality. In the first instance this is to refuse Miller’s dualism 
between the excessiveness of material culture and the reductionism of language. Rather 
language – as a physically embodied object of analysis – is itself internally unstable, a 
complex mixture of the abstract and the material (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Shields, 
1991). Secondly there is a need for the development of a tautological concept of 
materiality – that matter matters because it MATTERS. That is the significance of matter 
is defined by the expressive action of matter – its signifying and representative capacity. 
This is to suggest that current articulations must be more philosophically explicit in 
refusing to allow the resurgence of notions of matter as a pure, original conditionality. 
Indeed any re-articulation of matter must break the logic of causation between the 
subject and the object. There must be a valorisation of the ways in which matter acts 
independently of and upon the subject. It is the diversity of material forms, its dirty, 
unwieldy, messiness that defines any contemporary interest in the material. In fact it is 
only with a valorisation of the physically expansive action of matter that matter may well 
be articulated on-its-own terms, rather than as a strategic sign for a return to the basics. 
Surprisingly this form of matter – on-its-own terms – is anything but Kantian, or insistent 
upon forms of absolute materiality. Rather it necessitates a notion matter as 
simultaneously – and unevenly – discursive and physical. To activate a notion of matter 
as independently expressive is to suggest a fundamental interdwelling of the material and 
the representational. This is then to rethink the modes of analysis and methodological 
assumptions common in human geography. There is a need to abandon the notion that 
empirical methods are necessarily about the capturing of the external world as data, 
inasmuch as there is a need to discard notions of geographical practice as necessarily 
producing knowledge and representations of an external (and sometimes material) world. 
Rather there is a need to re-invigorate geographical practice with a conception of 
collaboration (Law, 1994). In producing knowledge geographical methods collaborate 
with the external world, they invite certain temporary alliances between material orders. 
In producing a re-materialised social and cultural geography matter does not simply 
become the subject of future investigation. Rather to produce material knowledge is, in 
Bergson’s (1908 [1991]) terms, to vary with matter itself. It is to engage the creative and 
expressive potential of the material collaboratively.  As such it is possible to initiate a 
notion of representation as material, as embodied and as problematically ontological. 
What matters about matter is not a simple and an unquestioned omnipresence but the 
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 ‘reality’ of matter’s own discursive and representative expression. Thus in conclusion in 
composing a re-materialised geography – one that does not ‘return’ so much as ‘re-ignite’ 
– the philosophical and metaphysical commitments of this move must be explicit. In 
talking of matter it is vital to define exactly what (or whose) kind of matter is enlivened.  
Acknowledgments 
Many thanks to Dr Kathy Mee, Dr Pauline McGuirk and the productive comments made 
by members of the Institute of Australian Geographers Cultural Geography Study group 
regarding a presentation of this paper at the Institute of Australian Geographers Cultural 
Geography Study Group Meeting, December 2001, The University of Newcastle. Also 
thanks to the five anonymous referees who made productive comments on an earlier 
draft of this paper.  
References 
 
Badcock, B. (1996) Looking-glass views of the city, Progress in Human Geography, 20: 91-99. 
 
Bergson, H., (1908) [1991] Matter and Memory. New York: Zone Books. 
 
Bingham, N. (1996) Object-ions: from technological determinism towards geographies of 
relations, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 14: 635-657. 
 
Butler, J. (1993) Bodies that Matter: On the discursive Limits of “Sex”. London and New York: 
Routledge. 
Butler, J. (1994) Gender and performance: an interview with Judith Butler, Radical 
Philosophy, 67: 32-39. 
 
Butler, J. (1997) Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative. London and New York: 
Routledge. 
 
Deleuze, G. (1967) Plato and the simulacrum. In Deleuze, G., 1969: The Logic of Sense. 
New York: Columbia University Press, , pp. 253-266.  
Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F., (1987) A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. The 
London: Athlone Press. 
Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (1994) What is Philosophy. London, New York: Verso. 
 
Gatens, M. (1996) Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power and Corporeality. London: Routledge. 
Gregson, N. (1995) And now it’s all consumption?, Progress in Human Geography, 19: 135-
141. 
Grosz, E. (1994) Volatile Bodies: Towards a Corporeal Feminism. St Leonards: Allen and 
Unwin. 
 17
 Grosz, E. (1999) Darwin and feminism: preliminary investigations of a possible alliance, 
Australian Feminist Studies, 14: 31-45. 
Hinchliffe, S. (1996) Technology, power and space – the means and ends of geographies 
of technology, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, D, 14: 659-82. 
Ingold, T. (1995) Building, dwelling, living: how animals and people make themselves at 
home in the world, in Strathen, M. (ed) Shifting Contexts: Transformations in 
Anthropological Knowledge. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 57-80. 
Jackson, P. (2000) Rematerializing social and cultural geography, Social and Cultural 
Geography, 1: 9-14. 
Jay, M. (1993) Downcast Eyes the Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought. 
Berkeley and London: University of California Press. 
Kirby, V. (1997) Telling Flesh: The Substance of the Corporeal. London and New York: 
Routledge. 
Kirby, V. (1999) Human nature, Australian Feminist Studies. 14: 19-29. 
Latour, B. (1993) We Have Never Been Modern. Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel. 
Law, J. (1994) Organizing Modernity. Oxford: Blackwell.  
Law, J. and Mol, A., (1995) Notes on materiality and sociality, Sociological Review, 43: 274-
294. 
Lawlor, L. (1998) The end of phenomenology: expressionism, in Deleuze and Merleau-
Ponty, Continental philosophy Review, 31: 15-34. 
Lees, L., (2002) Rematerializing geography: the ‘new’ urban geography, Progress in Human 
Geography, 26: 101-112.  
Longhurst, R. (1997) (Dis)embodied geographies, Progress in Human Geography 21(4), 486-
501. 
Miller, D. (1987) Material Culture and Mass Consumption. Oxford: Blackwell.  
Miller, D. (1998) Why some things matter, in Miller, D., (ed) 1998: Material Cultre: Why 
Some Things Matter. London: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 3-21. 
Miller, D., (2002) Turning Callon the right way up, Economy and Society, 31: 218-233. 
Mitchell, D. (1995) There’s no such thing as culture: towards a reconceptualization of the 
idea of culture in geography, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 20: 
102-116. 
Mitchell, D. (1996) Explanation in cultural geography: a reply to Cosgrove, Jackson and 
the Duncans, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 21: 580-582. 
 18
 Murdoch, J. (1997) Inhuman/nonhuman/human: actor-network theory and the 
prospects for a nondualistic and symmetrical perspective on nature and society, 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space,15: 731-756. 
Philo, C., 2000: More words, more worlds: Reflections on the ‘cultural turn’ and human 
geography, in Cook, I., Crouch, D., Naylor, S. and Ryan, J. R., Cultural 
Turns/Geographical Turns: Perspectives on Cultural Geography. Harlo: Prentice Hall, pp. 
26-53.  
Plato., 383 BC [1955] The Republic. Middlesex: Penguin Books. 
Rodríguez-Pose, A. (2001) Killing economic geography with a ‘cultural turn’ overdose, 
Antipode, 33: 176-182. 
Serres, M., (1995) Genesis, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press. 
 
Shields, R., (1991) Places on the Margin: Alternative Geographies of Modernity. London and New 
York: Routledge. 
Vattimo, G. (1988) Au-delà de la matière et du texte. La dissolution de la matière dans la 
pensèe contemporaine, in: Matière et Philosophie. Paris: Editions du Centre 
Pompidou, , pp. 49-70.  
Whatmore, S. (1997) Dissecting the autonomous self: hybrid cartographies for a 
relational ethics, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 15: 37-53. 
Whatmore, S. (2000) Elephants on the move: spatial formations of wildlife exchange, 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 18: 185-203. 
Wolch, J. and Emel, J. (1995) Bringing the animals back in, Environment and Planning D: 
Society and Space, 13: 632-636. 
Wolch, J. and Emel, J. (eds) (1998)Animal Geographies. London: Verso. 
Yeung, H. W. (2001) Does economics matter for/in economic geography, Antipode, 33: 
168-175. 
 19
  20
                                                          
 
1 For recent examples of this resilient vein of criticism see also Rodríguez-Pose (2001) or Yeung (2001). 
2 Indeed the object of this analysis is not to compose a critique of the total work of any one of these 
authors. Rather by grouping them here I mean to highlight the explicit  reintroduction of matter (as well as 
the physical into geographical analysis). 
3 This is to act upon Lees’ (2002) call for a definition of matter, as she states: ‘Defining what we actually 
mean by material and immaterial ought to be the first step in rematerializing geography.’ (p.102). 
4 This dualism between language and material culture is especially apparent in Miller’s work. Take for 
example his (2002) critique of Callon’s analysis of the market. Whilst the substance of this critique is not 
important here it is significant that in countering Callon he raises against him not only arguments but also 
an object. Indeed he challenges Callon’s notion of the market by drawing upon his own previous analysis of 
the Jajmani system of mutual exchange of objects and goods. In positioning this object – the subject of 
empirical and anthropological analysis – against Callon he again infers a kind of material excess that is 
simply irreducible to a more theoretical (i.e. linguistic) account of the same phenomenon.  
